
There’s a maddening amount of sound and fury these days on the subject of startup financing. Just yesterday, startupland’s enfant terrible, Jason Calacanis responding to a blog post by venture capitalist Bryce Roberts, made a bravado-drenched comment that’s become typical of the discussion:
“VCs, especially small ones…are no longer needed in the food chain…Small VC funds don’t provide enough value and are going to be disintermediated in the new world where money is table stakes.”
More than just inaccurate (in my experience), this kind of pronouncement plants a dangerous idea in the minds of young entrepreneurs.
Mark Suster said it best in his TechCrunch post yesterday: “To encourage people to run from skilled investors is bad advice. Ask anybody who has worked with a hand-on early stage investor (Fred Wilson, Josh Kopelman, Jon Callaghan) and they’ll tell you they wouldn’t do it any other way.” Amen.
The measure of a friend is whether (and how) they’re there for you in the worst of times. The same should be said of investors. When times are good, we founders are all about the upside. We obsess over valuation, deal terms, and “creating a market” for our stock. The number of available investors skyrockets during these good times, too, valuations and terms improve, driving the greed cycle upward. But when the shit hits the fan, especially when money’s involved, people are always surprised by how suddenly and shockingly things change. Then no one wants to talk about it afterwards. In that spirit, I think it’s important for me to tell a personal story of how a set of early stage venture capitalists had my company’s back through some very tough times.
Get Satisfaction, the company I founded with Amy Muller and Lane Becker, raised it’s original $1 million round of funding in August of 2007 from First Round Capital (FRC), O’Reilly Alphatech Ventures (OATV) and SoftTechVC. It feels like a million years ago, but the startup environment was riding a fresh wave of investment enthusiasm after the $1.5billion YouTube acquisition and the Web 2.0 surge, in the warming glow of an acquisitive Yahoo and Google, and an economy that still looked robust (ha!). This new class of micro-VCs was really just taking shape as a distinct category. FRC, OATV, True Ventures, SoftTech and others had all recently raised their first funds. After we closed the round, we had a clear directive–get market traction and initial proof of a scalable business model. Not too much; just enough to tell a compelling momentum story. The path had been paved by others before us: we’d go from seed round to $4million Series A financing with timepiece precision.
In retrospect, I can see the many wild-eyed assumptions we were making about how the next year would unfold. With a year of capital on hand we knew we’d have to start raising money in about six months (rule of thumb is that it takes 6+ months to raise a full round). This meant that in this incredibly short time period we’d have to:
- get compelling market traction, and build out an evidence-based financial model
- have a financing environment that was at least as favorable as the one we were currently in
- avoid being undermined by changes to the market that would challenge our position
As daunting as these conditions seem looking back on it, they’re basically the same as any seed stage company raising $500k-$1million today, give or take six months. It’s a very short window to get the stars to align.
Flash forward to April of ’08 and it appeared we’d made a good bet, in no small part due to the many hours Rob and Bryce had spent coaching us, and connecting us to their networks. We had strong growth in all our key indicators. The market seemed to be holding it’s own. We’d seen no new competitive threats. So we wrapped up our story up and went a-pitching.
The fundraising effort got off to a great start. Thanks again to our investors, we had a full calendar with top-tier VCs, steadily mastered our song-and-dance number, and before long were in active discussions with a few great firms. We started to get invited to partner meetings. I even bought swanky new shoes for the occasion.
And then something happened. Sometime in early Summer we started hearing from our investors that they were seeing Series A deals dragging or getting derailed for hazy reasons. A dark mood was beginning to descend on Sand Hill Road, which would bloom into outright depression a few months later after the financial collapse and Sequoia’s infamous RIP Good Times deck. We started worrying that our strong consumer adoption and a big anchor customer wasn’t necessarily going to be enough to close the deal. The compelling narrative of a few months before was now being dismissed as unconvincing. And sure enough, our active VC discussions started to fizzle. “Come back when you’re further along” was the refrain. By mid-July, it became obvious that we were not going to raise a round before we ran out of seed capital.
This is a terrible moment for any entrepreneur, the moment where the end is at hand and you seem to have no options left. With my partners by my side, I was crushed that I’d missed the mark. Our progress that seemed so promising a few months before was now indistinguishable from abject failure.
As it turned out, this was a moment of truth. Not for us founders, though; for our existing investors. They were seeing the same raw growth in our business that we were. We had plenty of work to do on figuring out the business model and building our team, but in their eyes we clearly “had a tiger by the tail.”
A “spray and pray” investor has only one path to deal with companies that fail to raise their next money. Write it off. Move on to the next investment. In major market downturns, the sudden disappearance of these investors is so striking it may as well be engraved in the geologic record.
To be clear: much of the time it’s probably the *right* choice to let a company die a peaceful death at this stage. While it’s hard for entrepreneurs to let go, it can be much worse to drag out a business that is not going anywhere. Good investors will work with founders to apply euthanasia with dignity. This is why many good firms have a “no bridge round” policy, in order to minimize the temptation of postponing the inevitable. [Note: an essential part of any VC diligence is to talk to portfolio founders who've had their businesses shut down]
But in this case theese deeply involved investors, Bryce and Rob, made a different move. They were as surprised by our Sand Hill defeat as us. There was the sense that we were getting caught up in an undertow that hinted at a new pessimism. This business was a not a horse they wanted to put out of its misery. They wanted to make sure it kept racing,. They rallied, and helped us put together an “inside round” with current investors. It wasn’t an easy path: it meant they were taking a risk with their partners and LPs, and we were taking on a lot more dilution and increased accountability. Frankly, though, that was not even a consideration. This was about survival.
It’s been two and a half years since that fateful turn, and we’ve been fortunate to grow an incredible business, bring on some great new investors including Azure Capital who led our most recent $6million financing last September. The future has never looked brighter for Get Satisfaction, and last I checked, our original investors couldn’t be happier for sticking with us through that sticky situation.
If you’re a founder you will almost surely go through challenging times of some kind. It’s impossible to predict what situations you’ll face, or really, how anybody will behave. What you can do is opt for investors that have a track record of active integrity (seriously, neutral/non-evil is not good enough), and build real, honest relationships with them.
Fortune cookie version: the investor you want is already suited up for handling the turbulence that makes others lose their lunch.
(Note: The brouhaha surrounding the pros/cons of AngelList this weekend has been dominated by investor opinions. It was great to hear from another entrepreneur, Micah Baldwin of Graphic.ly, talking candidly about his experience on the service: Is AngelList Creating False Hope?).